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Where and how does the brain code reward during social behavior? Almost all elements of
the brain’s reward circuit are modulated during social behavior. The striatum in particular is
activated by rewards in social situations. However, its role in social behavior is still poorly
understood. Here, we attempt to review its participation in social behaviors of different
species ranging from voles to humans. Human fMRI experiments show that the striatum
is reliably active in relation to others’ rewards, to reward inequity and also while learning
about social agents. Social contact and rearing conditions have long-lasting effects on
behavior, striatal anatomy and physiology in rodents and primates. The striatum also plays
a critical role in pair-bond formation and maintenance in monogamous voles. We review
recent findings from single neuron recordings showing that the striatum contains cells
that link own reward to self or others’ actions. These signals might be used to solve the
agency-credit assignment problem: the question of whose action was responsible for the
reward. Activity in the striatum has been hypothesized to integrate actions with rewards.
The picture that emerges from this review is that the striatum is a general-purpose
subcortical region capable of integrating social information into coding of social action
and reward.
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INTRODUCTION
The striatum is necessary for voluntary motor control. Research
on its role in movement planning and execution uncovered
its participation in cognition and reward processes. Rigorous
experimentation demanded social isolation to properly study
this neuronal circuit. However, action, rewards and cognition
also occur in the company of conspecifics, in a social con-
text. Social behaviors, those behaviors that occur in a social
context, place an extra demand on cognition since others’
behaviors are difficult to predict and they affect our own behav-
ior. Therefore, to understand the properties of the striatum it
is important to study it while the organism engages in social
behavior. Recent studies highlight this brain structure during
different social behaviors. Among these studies, we found that
the striatum contains neurons that signal the social action that
will result in own reward. We place these new findings within
the context of previous findings on the known role of this
area in movement and reward coding in the brain. The ques-
tion that guides the review is as follows: “does the striatum
serve a social function?” We conclude that the striatum is a
general-purpose subcortical region capable of integrating and
reflecting social information into its better known non-social
functions.
ANATOMY AND NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF THE STRIATUM
The striatum is the input module to the basal ganglia, a neuronal
circuit necessary for voluntary movement control (Hikosaka
et al., 2000). The striatum is composed of three nuclei: caudate,
putamen, and ventral striatum. The latter contains the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc). The caudate and putamen/ventral striatum
are separated by the internal capsule, a white matter tract between
brain cortex and brainstem.
Striatal afferents arrive from three major sources: cortex, mid-
brain and thalamus (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985; Haber,
2003). The cortical input from temporal, parietal and frontal
is mostly ipsilateral (Künzle, 1975; Vanhoesen et al., 1981) and
topographically arranged in the medio-lateral and dorsal-ventral
axes (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985; Haber, 2003; Haber
and Knutson, 2010). The striatum receives inputs from all ele-
ments of the reward circuit (Figure 1, reviewed in Haber and
Knutson, 2010): from striato-nigral midbrain cells (Beckstead
et al., 1979), amygdala (Russchen et al., 1985; Fudge et al., 2002),
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Haber et al., 2006), and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985;
Calzavara et al., 2007).
The striatum has two main efferent pathways. The direct
pathway is formed by axons of medium spiny neuron (MSN)
expressing D1 receptors which mainly project to GABAergic neu-
rons in the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) (Parent et al.,
1984; Gerfen et al., 1990; Kawaguchi et al., 1990; Chuhma et al.,
2011). MSN that express D2 receptors mostly target the external
segment of the globus pallidus (GPe) and form the indirect path-
way (Parent et al., 1984; Gerfen et al., 1990; Kawaguchi et al., 1990;
Chuhma et al., 2011). GABAeric neurons in GPe project to SNr
and the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) (Parent and
Hazrati, 1995; Wilson, 1998). The SNr and GPi are the output
nuclei of the basal ganglia.
The principal cell type in the striatum is the MSN (Wilson,
1998; Tepper and Bolam, 2004). These neurons release γ-amino
butyric acid (GABA) at their synaptic terminals (Wilson, 1998).
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FIGURE 1 | Depiction of the brain’s reward circuit highlighting the role
of the striatum and its anatomical connections. Abbreviations: dACC,
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; DPFC, dorsal prefrontal cortex; vmPFC,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; VP, ventral pallidum; LHb, lateral habenula;
Hypo, hypothalamus; STN, subthalamic nucleus; SN, substantia nigra; VTA,
ventral tegmental area; PPT, pedunculopontine tegmentum. Based on
Haber and Knutson (2010), reproduced with permission.
The striatum contains many other cell types besidesMSN, includ-
ing cholinergic and fast-firing GABAergic interneurons (Tepper
and Bolam, 2004). Cholinergic interneuron activity has a rela-
tionship to reward-predicting stimuli and reward and punish-
ment (Apicella et al., 1991b; Ravel et al., 2003). These firing
properties suggest that these neurons may play a role in learn-
ing (Schulz and Reynolds, 2013). Fast-firing interneurons are also
involved in reward prediction error coding (Stalnaker et al., 2012).
However, for brevity we will limit this review to MSN and refer
to them as striatal neurons. Functionally, striatal neurons show
motor and reward responses (Hikosaka et al., 2000). Functional
and anatomical evidence led to the hypothesis that striatal activ-
ity forms a “limbic-motor” interface (Mogenson et al., 1980).
Neurons in the striatum integrate information about expected
reward with motor information to guide behavior (Hollerman
et al., 1998; Hikosaka et al., 2000; Schultz, 2000; Schultz and
Dickinson, 2000; Goldstein et al., 2012). We review MSN neuro-
physiological responses to action and reward in the next section.
STRIATUM NEUROPHYSIOLOGY: ACTION AND REWARD
The striatum contains neuronal activity related to move-
ments, rewards and the conjunction of both movement and
reward. Striatal neurons show activity related to the preparation,
initiation and execution of movements (Hollerman et al., 2000).
These neurons are also active before overt goal-directed move-
ments (Schultz and Romo, 1988; Romo et al., 1992; Figure 2A).
Some of these neurons are exclusively active during self-
initiated movements, whilst other neurons are only active during
instructed trials, and some others do not discriminate between
self-initiated and instructed movements. In addition to this, stri-
atal neurons also show reward related activity. Neuronal activity
in the striatum is modulated by reward expectation indepen-
dent of the movement necessary to obtain it (Hikosaka et al.,
1989b; Apicella et al., 1991a, 1992; Schultz et al., 1992). Striatal
neurons that discharge after reward delivery do so in two main
modes: phasic or tonic. Phasic responses usually have short laten-
cies (<50ms) and are relatively short lived—median duration:
500ms (Apicella et al., 1991b; Hollerman et al., 1998; Lau and
Glimcher, 2007; Figure 2B). By contrast, tonic responses have
longer latencies and can last as long as the intertrial interval,
i.e., up to 3 s (Apicella et al., 1991b; Hollerman et al., 1998;
Histed et al., 2009). Furthermore, there are striatal neurons cod-
ing which action is associated to reward and which action is
not (Hollerman et al., 1998; Kawagoe et al., 1998; Figure 2C).
This coding is independent of the stimuli indicating the action
required to obtain reward (Kimchi and Laubach, 2009; Kimchi
et al., 2009). Reward-predicting cues modulate the activity of cau-
date neurons (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Lauwereyns et al., 2002). After
saccade execution up to 50% of neurons encode only the action,
while around 20% of recorded neurons encode whether the action
was rewarded or not and close to 40% of neurons are modulated
by both movement and reward (Kobayashi et al., 2006; Lau and
Glimcher, 2007). Together, these data suggest that striatal neurons
response is modulated by action and reward. These responses are
not limited to the moment of movement or reward receipt; rather
they are present during cue and during reward expectation.
Most striatal neurons that respond during task performance
show higher activity when a reward is expected compared to when
no reward is expected (Hollerman et al., 1998). However, there
are also neurons that are active preferentially after the monkey is
instructed to not move to obtain reward (Hollerman et al., 1998).
These data suggest that striatal neurons flexibly encode the type
of action that will produce reward.
An action-value neuron tracks the value of one action, inde-
pendent of the performed action. By tracking the value of dif-
ferent candidate actions and comparing their values an organism
can decide to exploit the most valuable action or to explore the
value of other actions. Samejima et al. (2005) were the first group
to show that striatal neurons code action-value (Figure 2D).
Neuronal activity tracked over time the value of performing one
action regardless of the animal’s choice. Later, Lau and Glimcher
(2008) trained macaques to perform a matching task. In this
task rewards are distributed probabilistically between two options
and subjects match the frequency with which they choose one
action with its reward probability (Herrnstein, 1961). This task
opens the possibility of investigating the presence of action-
value and chosen-value (i.e., value of the chosen action) neurons.
Indeed, Lau found that caudate neurons code both action-value
and chosen-value. These signals can inform decision making
mechanisms.
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FIGURE 2 | Action and reward coding by striatal neurons. (A)
Example striatal neuron active before movement (go) and silent before
no-movement (no-go). Based on Schultz and Romo (1988), reproduced
with permission. (B) Example striatal neurons coding reward. First row
depicts a neuron with phasic active after juice reward delivery
independent of the action to obtain reward. Second row depicts a
neuron with tonic activity after juice reward delivery. Third row shows a
neuron with tonic activity after no reward is delivered. Based on
Hollerman et al. (1998), reproduced with permission. (C) Example
caudate neuron coding the conjunction of action and reward. This
neuron is active during the presentation of a cue indicating the saccade
necessary to complete the trial if the trial will be rewarded (rewarded
direction is highlighted by a bulls eye). R, right; U, up; L, left; D, down.
Polar plots show the average response for each cue and direction.
Based on Kawagoe et al. (1998), reproduced with permission. (D) (Top)
Depiction of the probability of larger rewards associated with left or
right actions on each condition block. Colored numbers refer to the
probability associated with left-right actions. (Bottom) Example striatal
neuron coding right action value. Based on Samejima et al. (2005),
reproduced with permission.
In conclusion, the striatum contains neuronal activity related
to movements, rewards and the conjunction of both movement
and reward. These neuronal representations serve many functions
like goal directed movements and decision making.
STRIATAL ACTIVITY DURING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
SOCIAL REWARD
Rewards are events or objects that elicit learning, elicit approach
behavior and produce positive emotions (Schultz, 2004). Social
rewards are just like any other rewards with the particular-
ity that they occur in a social context. We propose a simple
classification of social rewards using two axes: who acts and who
receives reward. For example, observing others is a social reward
(Anderson, 1998; Deaner et al., 2005) where the individual acts
(observes) and receives reward (the social stimuli). Pro-social
behavior refers to a preference to increase the welfare of oth-
ers (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Depending on individual social
preferences these choices can be rewarding by themselves, e.g., in
charitable giving (Harbaugh et al., 2007). Vicarious reward refers
to the situation when observing someone else receive reward is
rewarding in itself (Mobbs et al., 2009). Finally, in several social
rewards the recipient is the individual and the actor is someone
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else. Examples of other’s actions that are rewarding include praise
and pleasant touch (Francis et al., 1999; Olausson et al., 2002;
Rolls et al., 2008; Korn et al., 2012). Building a desired repu-
tation is also considered a social reward; critically, reputation
depends on other’s perception of the individual, not on the indi-
vidual’s perception of herself (Izuma et al., 2008; Izuma, 2012).
Receiving gifts or social actions that result in own reward can also
be considered as other-generated social rewards. Social inclusion
can be considered a social reward and facilitates learning (Eger
et al., 2013). Although this classificationmight further our under-
standing of the neuronal underpinnings of social rewards, further
experimentation might validate its use.
Observing others
Fuelling a brain entails a huge cost, and the ratio of brain size
to body size is larger in primates than any other Order in the ani-
mal kingdom (Laughlin and Sejnowski, 2003; Dunbar and Shultz,
2007). The huge cost of fuelling a large brain begs the ques-
tion what is the benefit of such large brains? Byrne and Whitten
suggest that only a costly primate brain can deal with the com-
plexity of primate social living, the so-called social brain hypoth-
esis (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). The primate brain has a great
deal of specializations to acquire information about conspecifics.
Neurons in the ventral visual pathway respond selectively to bio-
logical motion, gaze direction, body parts and faces (Perrett et al.,
1984, 1985a,b; Gross, 1992; Oram and Perrett, 1996; Tsao et al.,
2006). Social information arrives through all senses. For exam-
ple, the superior temporal polysensory area contains neurons that
selectively respond to conspecific calls (Perrodin et al., 2011) and
local field potentials in the temporal lobe are modulated by face
or call familiarity (Báez-Mendoza and Hoffman, 2009). The vol-
ume of gray matter correlates with the size of the individual’s
troop in mid superior temporal sulcus, inferotemporal cortex,
rostral superior temporal sulcus, amygdala—all areas involved
in perceiving individuals—and rostral PFC in macaques (Sallet
et al., 2011). These findings suggest that the brain has special-
ized structures dealing with the acquisition and representation of
information about conspecifics.
If the brain has specialized structures for the acquisition and
representation of information about conspecifics, then acquir-
ing this information must be valuable for the individual. In a
clever paradigm Deaner and colleagues measured the value of
acquiring access to observe pictures of conspecifics (Deaner et al.,
2005). They pitted a constant amount of juice against a variable
amount of juice plus the opportunity to observe the picture of a
conspecific. The monkeys made their choices depending on the
amount of juice offered along with the picture. If the monkey
chose a smaller amount of juice plus the opportunity to watch
an image, it strongly indicated that the monkey valued watching
the image equivalent to the difference between offered juice vol-
umes. For example, a monkey that likes watching a high-ranking
monkey will choose watching the image and receiving 0.8ml of
juice vs. only receiving 1ml of juice. When the monkey chose with
equal probability between the two alternatives then the difference
in offered juice volume is the subjective value for observing the
image, the so-called point of subjective equivalence. Researchers
using this method can measure the subjective value of varying
juice magnitudes (fluid value) and that of social images (image
value). Another advantage of this method is that it facilitates the
comparison of different goods (Glimcher, 2010), e.g., observing
female perinea or a subordinate male face. Using this method
Deaner and colleagues reported that male monkeys valued highly
looking at dominant monkeys and the perinea of female monkeys
compared to looking at subordinate monkeys or a non-salient
visual stimulus (Deaner et al., 2005).
Neuronal activity during this task has been measured in dif-
ferent brain regions. LIP neuronal activity correlates with both
image value and fluid value when themonkeys chose to look at the
image (Klein et al., 2008). OFC neurons showed distinct coding
of reward magnitude or image value, but not both (Watson and
Platt, 2012). Thus, these results suggest that OFC neurons do not
code reward on a single currency (e.g., in juice volume), rather as
different variables, as shown before (O’Neill and Schultz, 2010).
Intriguingly, these animals strongly preferred looking at pictures
of subordinates, a finding at odds with previously reported strong
preferences for dominant faces in the same paradigm (Deaner and
Platt, 2003; Deaner et al., 2005; Shepherd et al., 2006; Klein et al.,
2008); but this result suggests that the encoding of social reward
reflects subjective preferences.
Neurons in the anterior striatum showed an interesting
response pattern in the same paradigm (Klein and Platt, 2013).
The large majority of reward responsive neurons were selective
for reward type. These neurons also showed a regional pattern:
those in the caudate were more strongly modulated by social
reward, conversely, putamen neurons were more strongly modu-
lated by liquid reward. This pattern can be alternatively explained
by simple saccade direction coding because caudate neurons are
tuned for saccade direction, particularly for contralateral saccades
(Hikosaka et al., 1989a).
Humans also value observing other humans; and among dif-
ferent targets we value highly observing our romantic partners
and mothers (Bartels and Zeki, 2000, 2004; Aron, 2005; Acevedo
et al., 2012). Observing pictures of a partner elicits higher blood
oxygenated level-dependant (BOLD) activity in caudate/putamen
and VTA along with cingulate and insular cortex compared to
viewing pictures of friendsmatched for age, gender and length-of-
friendship as their partners (Figure 3, green squares). This effect
is present either when the relationship is recent (Aron, 2005)
or when has been long established (Acevedo et al., 2012). These
BOLD responses are a neural correlate of the value of observing a
loved one.
In summary, acquiring social information, in particular look-
ing at conspecifics, is valuable for the individual (Deaner et al.,
2005). The primate temporal lobe contains regions whose func-
tion includes the processing of social information (Tsao et al.,
2006; Perrodin et al., 2011). Both social information and value
converge in the striatum, opening the possibility of social reward
coding in this brain region—as shown by Klein and Platt (2013).
Other social rewards
A positive reputation is a social reward as it can elicit learning,
approach behavior and positive emotions. This is particularly evi-
dent in indirect reciprocity: a donor who helps a recipient in
public might receive in the future a donation from someone that
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FIGURE 3 | fMRI studies of social behaviors in which the striatum is
active. Peak activation coordinates in the striatum of the fMRI studies
cited in this review color-coded for each section as illustrated in the
legend. Studies using a region of interest analysis strategy were not
included in this image. These striatal responses are compatible with a
general activation in response to social behaviors, including social rewards.
A functional subdivisions according to types of social rewards need to
await further experiments. Studies aggregated in “Other social rewards”:
(Rilling et al., 2002; Moll et al., 2006; Izuma et al., 2008; Mobbs et al.,
2009; Acevedo et al., 2012; Fareri et al., 2012; Korn et al., 2012). Studies
clustered in “Observing others”: (Bartels and Zeki, 2000, 2004; Aron,
2005; Acevedo et al., 2012). Studies in “Learning about others”: (Delgado
et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008; Burke
et al., 2010; Phan et al., 2010; Xiang et al., 2012; Fouragnan et al., 2013).
Studies in “Reward inequity”: (Moll et al., 2006; Fliessbach et al., 2007;
Hsu et al., 2008; Tricomi et al., 2010).
has observed its “altruistic” behavior (Nowak, 2006). Obtaining
a good reputation from others increases BOLD activity in the
human striatum (Izuma et al., 2008; Korn et al., 2012) (Figure 3,
red squares), but not in individuals diagnosed with autism (Izuma
et al., 2011). This difference is likely due to insensitivity to social
rewards in autistics (Dawson et al., 1998; Schultz, 2005).
Other social rewards that also increase BOLD activity in
the striatum include charitable donations (Moll et al., 2006;
Harbaugh et al., 2007) and observing someone else succeed
(Mobbs et al., 2009). Vicarious reward is also modulated by the
closeness of the recipient: there is higher striatal BOLD activ-
ity when sharing a monetary gain with close friends compared
to sharing with strangers, and sharing with the latter is associ-
ated with higher activations compared to when the “recipient” is
a computer (Fareri et al., 2012). This social vs. non-social effect
has also been observed when cooperating with a human partner
vs. cooperating with a computer (Rilling et al., 2002). The peak
activations from studies cited in this section are illustrated with
red squares in Figure 3. Taken together, these data suggest that
social rewards are associated with BOLD activity in the striatum
and can be modulated by the social context.
LEARNING ABOUT SOCIAL AGENTS
Social life is rife with opportunities to learn about others. For
example, we learn to trust or mistrust other people. The trust
game is an economic game that measures how trust is built
between two individuals. During the trust game the investor
receives an initial endowment that she can choose to invest in
a trustee, the trustee receives three times the investment and
decides how much of the gains to return to the investor. When
this game is played iteratively the investor learns to trust (or
mistrust) the trustee and vice versa. Thus, both players develop
a model of the other’s reputation (King-Casas et al., 2005). To
build a trust model investors use previous behavior to predict
future behavior. If there is a deviation from what is predicted—
a reward prediction error—then the model is updated. Activity in
dorsal striatum mirrored prediction errors during the repayment
phase (Figure 3, yellow squares; King-Casas et al., 2005). When
an investor returned more than what a trustee expected the
trustee reciprocated by increasing her investment. During the
investment phase activity increased in middle cingulate cor-
tex of the investor and also in ACC of the trustee. Activity
in both areas correlated with activity in the trustee’s caudate;
most importantly the peak of these correlations shifted from the
repayment epoch to the investment epoch (King-Casas et al.,
2005). These results suggest that generating someone else’s rep-
utation engages a reinforcement learning algorithm that uses
prediction errors and the latter are reflected in striatal BOLD
activity.
Prior information about someone’s trustworthiness sets the
initial state of the trust model. This initial bias can be overruled
by observing someone’s willingness to reciprocate trust (Figure 3,
yellow squares; Delgado et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2010; Fouragnan
et al., 2013). Prior information diminishes the magnitude of the
reward prediction error signal in the striatum during the repay-
ment phase (Fouragnan et al., 2013). Following advice to solve a
task (a type of prior information) generates an outcome-bonus in
a version of the Iowa gambling task (Biele et al., 2011). These stud-
ies suggest that prior information not only sets the initial state of
the trust model, but it has a long lasting effect on its computation.
Depth-of-thought refers to a person’s inference about some-
one else’s intention and to how many iterations of this inference
they perform (Dixit and Skeath, 2004). Players in the trust game
solve the game with different levels of depth-of-thought (Xiang
et al., 2012). If the investor makes no inference about the trustee’s
intention to reciprocate, then a prediction error occurs when
the trustee does not reciprocate trust. This prediction error is
reflected in increased striatal activity (Figure 3, yellow squares;
Xiang et al., 2012). If the investor infers that he plays this game
against a trustee that infers what he will offer, then the predic-
tion error occurs when the investor submits its investment to the
trustee; again, the striatum reflects this prediction error (Xiang
et al., 2012). Thus, the computation of prediction errors, during
the trust game, depends on depth-of-thought.
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Oxytocin, a neuropeptide, also modifies how we update
the trust model. Intranasal administration of this neuropep-
tide increases the rate of trust decisions compared to placebo,
even after repeated violations of trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005).
Correspondingly, people that received oxytocin showed a smaller
negative prediction error signal in the striatum after repeated
violations of trust (Baumgartner et al., 2008). Although the dis-
tribution of oxytocin receptors in the human brain is unknown,
one possible locus where oxytocin modifies trust is in the stria-
tum (see section “Involvement of the Striatum in Pair-Bond
Formation and Maintenance” below).
Social life is also rife with opportunities to learn from oth-
ers. Observational learning is another social cognitive process
that can be modeled with reinforcement learning. Burke and col-
leagues hypothesized that observational learning is composed of
two prediction errors, an action observation prediction error and
an outcome observation prediction error (Burke et al., 2010). In
their task two individuals took turns to learn which one of two
decks of cards provided a better outcome. In order to disentan-
gle individual learning from imitation learning and observational
learning the individuals performed the task in three conditions:
other’s actions and outcomes were private, only the other’s out-
come was visible and both the partner’s action and outcome were
observable. Burke and colleagues found a correlate for action
observation prediction error in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) and for outcome observation in ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (VMPFC) and ventral striatum (Figure 3, yellow
squares). Specifically, VMPFC activity correlated positively and
ventral striatum correlated negatively with the outcome observa-
tion prediction error (Burke et al., 2010). Thus, they found neural
correlates of observational learning in frontal cortex and ventral
striatum.
In conclusion, the neuronal mechanism of learning to trust
someone else or from someone else is based on a reinforce-
ment learning algorithm. This algorithmmakes predictions about
other’s behavior and prediction errors help to update the model.
The type of predictions depends on depth-of-thought and prior
information modifies the rate to which the model is updated.
These learning signals are reflected in changes in BOLD activity
in the striatum.
INEQUITY AND FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS
Inequity arises from an asymmetric distribution of resources
between two or more conspecifics. Classic economics assumes
that agents always intend to maximize their own benefit regard-
less of other’s wellbeing (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).
However, the difference in resource distribution can have a neg-
ative impact on the utility and subjective value of an object
(Loewenstein et al., 1989; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The disu-
tility from an unequal outcome depends on who obtains more
resources. When the agent receives more than the conspecific,
we speak of advantageous inequity. Conversely, when the agent
receives less than the conspecific we speak of disadvantageous
inequity.
Interestingly, humans choose to lower their own payoff so that
inequity is smaller, a so-called pro-social behavior. For exam-
ple, when people donate money to charity they diminish their
wealth so that others can be better off (Harbaugh et al., 2007).
Disadvantageous inequity, having less than others, can have a
negative effect in behavior. For example, progressive taxation is
designed to reduce income inequality by implementing higher
taxes on higher earners (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). An influ-
ential hypothesis of how people react to inequity (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999) posits that unequal payoffs are aversive, there-
fore agents try to minimize them. This theory has its roots on
the idea that one can estimate social utility functions that spec-
ify level of satisfaction as a function of outcome to self and other
(Loewenstein et al., 1989). Other example theories where social
utility functions help to explain human preferences that devi-
ate from pure maximization include “Equity, Reciprocity, and
Competition” by Bolton and Ockenfels (Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000) and “Fairness” by Rabin (Rabin, 1993).
One experimental task commonly used to measure advan-
tageous inequity aversion is the dictator game (Forsythe et al.,
1994). In this task the person playing as dictator receives an ini-
tial financial endowment and decides to give an amount of the
endowment to a receiver. The neoclassical assumption of ratio-
nal behavior predicts that dictators will not give away anything
of their payoff; however, dictators usually give away between 5
and 25% of their initial endowment (Forsythe et al., 1994). It is
assumed that the proportion of money given to the receiver is a
measure of the disutility for the dictator of having more than the
other (Gibbons, 1992; Camerer et al., 2004). To measure disad-
vantageous inequity aversion scientists use the ultimatum game
(Güth et al., 1982). In this game the proposer receives an endow-
ment and proposes a split to the responder, just as in the dictator
game. The responder then either rejects the split, thereby forgoing
all monies, or accepts it. Neoclassical economic models predict
that the responder will accept any split that results in him hav-
ing more than nothing. However, responders tend to only accept
splits where they obtain more than 30% of the initial endowment
(Güth et al., 1982). The responder’s minimum acceptable offer
is the percentage of the initial endowment that he is willing to
accept 50% of the time (Camerer et al., 2004). This last parameter
is directly proportional to the degree of disadvantageous inequity
aversion.
When subjects play the dictator game as dictators the ventral
striatum is active when deciding to donate money to a charity
(Moll et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007) and when enacting
the decision on how to distribute a good between two chari-
table possibilities (Hsu et al., 2008). The relative wealth of the
donor and the receiver also matter to how the brain responds
to these decisions. After one of two volunteers is made better-
off than the other volunteer, the worse-off volunteers ranked
receivingmoneymuchmore appealing than their better-off coun-
terparts (Tricomi et al., 2010). Accordingly, ventral striatum and
VMPFC show higher activity during transfers to self than to the
other. Better-off volunteers found more appealing that the other
received money than themselves. Ventral striatum and VMPFC
reflected this preference: both brain regions showed higher activ-
ity during transfers to other than to self (Tricomi et al., 2010).
In a related experiment, Fliessbach and colleagues paid in differ-
ent ratios to pairs of volunteers for correctly completing a simple
task while they were in an MRI scanner (Fliessbach et al., 2007).
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Ventral striatum activity was positively correlated with the ratio
of the payoff regardless of the actual personal monetary payoff.
Furthermore, striatal activity was lowest during own errors and
highest during other’s errors. Such a social contrast has been con-
firmed, e.g. activity in ventral striatum is higher after winning a
lottery in public vs. winning the same amount in private (Bault
et al., 2011). The peak activations from the fMRI studies cited
in this section are illustrated in Figure 3 with pink squares. Thus,
these data suggest that the striatum reflects the difference between
own and other’s rewards.
AGENCY CODING IN STRIATAL NEURONS
Reciprocal social interactions provide the opportunity to increase
fitness through repeated exchanges with a particular individ-
ual, although one of its by-products is reward inequality. For
this interaction to be successful several mental processes need
to take place (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981): both participants
need to identify their partner, assign agency for the current out-
come, decide how to act depending on the series of events and
keep a tally of the recent exchanges. Without partner identifi-
cation reciprocity is virtually impossible (unless all interactions
take place with a uniform population) (Dawkins, 2006). Without
a memory trace of the outcomes of the recent exchanges, par-
ticipants might see themselves locked onto a “one-way street”
reciprocal exchange. Agency assignment allows the individual to
assign credit (or blame) for a shared outcome (Wolpert et al.,
2003; Tomlin et al., 2006). With precise agency assignment in
the memory of recent exchanges individuals can avoid free rid-
ers (Dawkins, 2006). Therefore, agency assignment is a trait that
might have been favored by evolution in social animals.
Another way to frame the problem of agency assignment is
to think of it as the “social” extension of the credit-assignment
problem (Figure 4A). Let us revise what the credit-assignment
problem is. In order for an action to be reinforced, it needs to
be selected from various actions made between the operant and
the reinforce. The organism needs to assign credit to the oper-
ant, and not assign (or subtract) credit to other non-contingent
actions (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This is done by changing the
weights of different eligibility traces, or memories of past actions
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). The agency credit assignment problem
applies when more than one actor can generate a reward (Tomlin
et al., 2006). Thus, the agency credit assignment problem can be
cast by paraphrasing Sutton and Barto (1998): how do you dis-
tribute credit for success among the many actors that may have
been involved in producing it?
The striatum is well-suited for integrating social action (an
action made in a social context) and reward given its anatom-
ical connections and known role in action and reward coding.
We recorded striatal neuron’s activity while an animal performed
a reward giving task with a conspecific in order to investigate
the interaction of social action and reward (Báez-Mendoza et al.,
2013). The reward giving task is an extension of the paradigm
described by Hollerman et al. (1998) to encompass several social
dimensions. In the original paradigm the activity of striatal neu-
rons was tested for relationships to movement vs. no-movement
and reward vs. no-reward. In our task we tested if striatal neu-
ron activity was related to own vs. conspecific’s movement and
own and/or conspecific’s reward. During the experiment two
monkeys sat opposite each other across a table with a touch-
screen. Both animals took turns to complete the following task:
the actor held a resting key with its right arm, the computer
presented two simultaneous cues predicting reward (circle) or
no reward (square) separately for each animal (Figure 4B), fol-
lowed by a blue go signal eliciting the actor’s arm movement for
touching it (Figure 4B). After a brief delay, the computer deliv-
ered reward to the actor and then to the conspecific. We were
able to probe the neuronal correlates of agency and reward cod-
ing by varying reward presence and absence for both players and
who performed the task. This simple test allowed us to test the
neuronal mechanisms of a complex cognitive process.
Our first concern was whether the monkeys were sensitive to
the social nature of the task. Reaction times and eye fixation anal-
ysis suggested that the monkeys were sensitive to reward received
by themselves and their conspecific. Importantly, the animals
were less likely to move whenever it was the conspecific’s turn,
suggesting that they had an understanding of the turn-taking
structure of the task. This is particularly relevant for agency credit
assignment because during “own turns” the animal should have
assigned credit to itself for own reward and during “conspecific’s
turns” to the conspecific.
Own reward modulated the activity of striatal neurons, as pre-
viously observed (Hikosaka et al., 1989b; Apicella et al., 1991a);
but few striatal neurons responded to conspecific’s reward.
Interestingly, a sub-population of neurons differentiated between
social actors, with some neurons firing more strongly during
one of the actor’s turn. Given these types of neuronal modula-
tions, we then looked at the neurons’ sensitivity to whose turn
it was. A large number of own reward coding neurons reflected
the social actor: some neurons responded to own reward only
when the recorded animal acted (Figure 4C) whereas a different
sub-population responded to own reward when the conspecific
acted (Figure 4D). We tested a series of alternative hypothesis for
these data including: eye position, response inhibition, temporal
discounting and reward cost, none of which were a satisfactory
explanation of the data.
We also found a collection of neurons that reflected whose
trial it was. These neurons fired more strongly during own trials
than conspecific’s trials, or vice versa: conspecific > own tri-
als. These neurons reflected social action as they differentiated
between actors. To test whether these neurons truly reflected a
“social” component of the task we measured their activity while
the animal performed the task with the conspecific or a non-
social juice recipient (an empty bucket). If a neuron is modulated
by the social component of the task, then it should stop differ-
entiating between actors during the “bucket test.” This test for
social-specific coding indicated that close to 50% of social actor
coding-neurons were indeed modulated by the social environ-
ment. This is, to our knowledge, the first direct test of a neuronal
correlate of social behavior in single neurons.
These experiments showed that there are multiple signals in
the striatum relevant for social interactions. The data suggests an
extension of the known role of the striatum in movement and
reward processing into the social domain. Several questions arise
from these findings.
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FIGURE 4 | Agency credit assignment cartoon and striatal neurons
coding social action and own reward. (A) Once the monkey receives a
banana it needs to know which action produced reward to assign credit.
The action can be its own (solid lines) or someone else’s (dashed lines).
Many actions take place before reward is delivered, therefore looking at a
memory of each action or eligibility trace (brown arrows) can solve the
agency credit assignment problem. (B) Task sequence for the actor: shape
of conditioned cue predicted absence or presence of reward for each
animal. Appearance of a subsequent blue go signal was followed by key
release, stimulus touch and reward for actor, and later for conspecific. After
the ITI the monkeys switched roles as actor and passive. (C) Single striatal
neuron coding own action and own reward. Note the higher neuronal
activity during own action and own reward compared to own reward
absence and conspecific’s actions. (D) Single striatal neuron coding social
action and own reward. This neuron is active during conspecific’s actions
that will result in own reward, a complement to the neuron shown in (A).
Monkey picture by smerikal (Flickr), reproduced with permission. Panels
(B–D) based on Báez-Mendoza et al. (2013), reproduced with permission.
How are these signals formed? One possible mechanism is
as follows: Striatal neurons receive biological motion informa-
tion either directly from area STP (Oram and Perrett, 1996) or
indirectly via parietal lobe (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1991)
while simultaneously receiving reward-related information from
dopaminergic neurons and other reward-related areas (Haber
and Knutson, 2010, see also Figure 1). Converging inputs and
local interactions (Chuhma et al., 2011) are also well-suited to
combine information about other’s actions and own reward.
Future experiments will test and measure the formation of
agency and reward conjoint coding in the population of striatal
neurons.
Another issue is: how are these signals used? We hypothesize
that this neuronal signal may help assign, andmaintain, credit to a
social agent when receiving reward in a social context. Solving this
problem is necessary for successful interactions. It is possible the
striatum provides a signal to distribute credit for reward among
the many actors that may have been involved in producing it. One
key experiment would test the individual-specificity of this signal:
is the signal specific for one individual or it only discriminates
between own action and “other’s” actions? Such a fine grained
signal would aid in discriminating who is a better partner and
who is not.
SOCIAL CONTACT AND STRIATAL FUNCTION
The striatum is involved in other social behaviors besides social
action, social reward and reward inequity. Social isolation and
social defeat compromise the normal function of the striatum.
These effects highlight the interplay between normal social con-
tact and striatal function. Social isolation has long-lasting effects
in behavior, neuronal anatomy and neurochemistry. For example,
social deprivation in the first year of life of macaques is related
to abnormal social behaviors including fearfulness, withdrawal,
lack of play, apathy, indifference to external stimuli, deficien-
cies in communication and aggression (Martin et al., 1991).
Macaques reared in social deprivation show decreased numbers
of caudate/putamen neurons reactive to substance P, tyrosine
hydroxylase (TH), leucine-enkephaline, and calbindin; in con-
trast, the number of somatostatin interneurons did not differ to
normally-reared conspecifics. TH staining was reduced in SNc
but neuron numbers were stable. Other subcortical regions were
unaffected, including the NAcc, amygdala and BNST (Martin
et al., 1991). Further characterization of the behavioral, anatomi-
cal and neurochemical effects of social isolation have been carried
out in rodents.
Social isolation leaves consistent behavioral effects on
rodents. These include hyper-reactivity to novel environments,
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a reduction in the pre-pulse inhibition of the acoustic startle, and
an increase in aggressive behavior (reviewed by Fone and Porkess,
2008). Also, studies of the neuroanatomy of isolates’ brains
describe changes in cortical and subcortical neuronal circuits. For
example, after social isolation rats showed decreased dendritic
spine density in prefrontal cortex and hippocampus compared to
socially-housed littermates (Silva-Gomez et al., 2003). There are
several reports on differences in neurotransmitter systems, for a
systematic review see (Fone and Porkess, 2008). Of particular rel-
evance to this review, the dopaminergic system of socially isolated
rats is different to that of socially-housed animals.
Although socially isolated rats show normal basal levels of
extracellular dopamine (DA) in the ventral striatum, systemic
administration of d-amphetamine produces a significant increase
in DA release compared to socially-reared rats (Wilkinson et al.,
1994; Hall et al., 1999). Furthermore, isolation-reared rats show
an increase in DA turnover and in hyper-locomotion induced by
d-amphetamine (Hall et al., 1998). Injections of cocaine increase
DA efflux in ventral striatum, an effect potentiated by isola-
tion rearing (Howes et al., 2000). Intriguingly, isolates acquire
faster operant responding to obtain low doses of cocaine but
their acquisition is slower for higher doses compared to socially-
housed rats (Howes et al., 2000). Deficits in pre-pulse inhibition
of the acoustic startle in socially-isolated rats are reversed by
administration of the D2 receptor antagonist raclopride (Geyer
et al., 1993). DA depletion in ventral striatum after administra-
tion of 6-hydroxydopamine also facilitates pre-pulse inhibition in
socially-isolated rats (Powell et al., 2003). Interestingly, basal lev-
els of extracellular DA in ventral striatum do not differ between
socially-isolated and socially-reared rats (Wilkinson et al., 1994;
Hall et al., 1999; Howes et al., 2000). These results suggest that
basal mesolimbic DA is unaffected by social isolation, rather the
ventral striatum is “hypersensitive” to events that naturally trigger
DA release.
One candidate mechanism for the hypersensitive ventral stria-
tum of socially-isolated rats is a difference in receptor levels. Yet
some groups report no changes in D1 or D2 receptor density or
affinity in striatum (Bardo and Hammer, 1991; Del Arco et al.,
2004); while others report an increase in D2 binding (Djouma
et al., 2006). Changes in housing condition, however, modify the
levels of D2 receptors in the monkey striatum (Morgan et al.,
2002). Specifically, after monkeys were socially housed, dom-
inant monkeys had higher levels of D2 receptors in striatum
compared to when they were housed individually and to subor-
dinates. Interestingly, subordinates consumed more and worked
more for intravenous injections of cocaine than dominant mon-
keys (Morgan et al., 2002). This finding is further supported by
a negative correlation between the baseline levels of D2 receptors
and the rate of cocaine self-administration and a decrease in D2
receptor levels with chronic cocaine use (Nader et al., 2006). Thus,
these results suggest that D2 receptor density can be modified by
changes in the social environment.
Changes in social hierarchy result in winners and losers: lower
ranking individuals were usually defeated by their conspecifics
and lost their rank. After losing one or more encounters with a
conspecific, mesostriatal transmission is modified in the defeated
individual. Tidey and Miczek (1996) reported that rats that were
defeated by a conspecific, showed higher concentrations of extra-
cellular DA in ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex during a
social encounter with a dominant rat compared to baseline. If
rats remained isolated after being defeated, the number of stri-
atal dopamine transporter (DAT) binding sites was reduced, while
there were no changes in DAT in animals that returned to the
familiar group (Isovich et al., 2001). A potential role of levels
of DAT in regulation of social behavior is suggested by a report
of DAT knockout mice which exhibited increased rates of reac-
tivity and aggression following mild social contact (Rodriguiz
et al., 2004). Mice who experienced chronic social defeat avoid
making contact with conspecifics and show increased levels of
brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) in the NAcc up to 4
weeks after the last defeat (Berton et al., 2006). BDNF potenti-
ates DA release in the NAcc by acting in pre- and post-synaptic
sites (Russo and Nestler, 2013). The major source of BDNF in
NAcc is dopaminergic neurons in VTA. BDNF deletion in these
cells of chronically-defeated mice results in an increase in social
contact, suggesting that BDNF plays a key role in the main-
tenance of the social defeat phenotype (Berton et al., 2006).
These selected studies highlight that mesolimbic dopaminer-
gic transmission is modified following acute or chronic social
defeats.
In conclusion there are behavioral, anatomical and neuro-
chemical consequences of social isolation. There is a marked
reduction in the number of striatal interneurons, but basal lev-
els of extracellular DA remain unchanged. There is no consensus
whether there are changes in DA receptor levels in the striatum,
but other signaling systems (BDNF) and molecular mechanisms
(changes in DAT) are involved. This snapshot of studies on the
relationship between social housing conditions, behavior and
basal ganglia function suggest that this is not a simple relation-
ship. Notwithstanding, it can be concluded that social isolation
and social defeat result in changes in neurotransmission to the
mesolimbic circuit.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE STRIATUM IN PAIR-BOND FORMATION AND
MAINTENANCE
Sex is a primary reward and it is the basis of pair-bond formation
in voles. The striatum is part of the neuronal circuitry underlying
a remarkable pair-bond formation in which both partners remain
monogamous. It is important to note that the role of the striatum
extends beyond that of movement and reward. Studies on vole
pair formation provide an interesting example of the interaction
between social behavior and striatal function.
There are two similar species in the same genus: one of
which is monogamous and the other promiscuous. Prairie voles
(Microtus ochrogaster) form life-long bonds with their first mate,
remain monogamous and live in burrows with extended fam-
ilies; meadow voles (Microtus pennsylvanicus), in contrast, are
a promiscuous species often living in solitary burrows (Insel,
2010). This natural dissociation in pair formation provides the
opportunity to tap into the neurobiology of social behavior.
The interplay of oxytocin, arginine-vasopressin and DA play
a pivotal role in pair formation in voles. Administration of
haloperidol—an unselective DA inverse agonist—in male prairie
voles’ NAcc prevents partner preference, whilst stimulating
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D2-like receptors in caudate-putamen induces partner prefer-
ence in the absence of mating (Aragona et al., 2003, 2006).
Conversely, DA D1-like receptor activation prevents pair-bond
formation (Aragona et al., 2006). This mechanism is similar in
females, since D2-like receptor stimulation induces partner pref-
erence whereas administration of a D1-like agonist had no effect
(Wang et al., 1999). Vasopressin V1a receptor gene transfer into
the ventral pallidum of polygamous meadow voles is sufficient to
induce pair-bond-like behavior after mating (Lim et al., 2004b).
Similarly, overexpression of oxytocin receptor in NAcc facilitated
partner preference in female prairie voles but has no effect in
parental care, nor any effect on female meadow voles (Ross et al.,
2009). Prairie voles have a high density of oxytocin-receptors in
the NAcc and of vasopressin V1a receptors in the ventral pallidum
compared to meadow voles (Insel and Shapiro, 1992; Hammock
and Young, 2006). Interestingly, oxytocin-receptors are bound
by oxytocin, and with lower affinity, vasopressin (Gimpl and
Fahrenholz, 2001). Interestingly, there are no differences in the
distribution of D1-like and D2-like receptors in the striatum
between these two species (Lim et al., 2004a). Thus, these results
suggest that the differential distribution of oxytocin and vaso-
pressin receptors is responsible for pair-bond formation. In con-
clusion, pair-bond formation is modulated by the interaction of
oxytocin, vasopressin and DA in NAcc neurons as well as the
distribution of oxytocin and vasopressin V1a receptors.
The role of oxytocin and vasopressin in social recognition is
supported further by the absence of habituation to conspecifics in
oxytocin and V1a-R knockout mice (Ferguson et al., 2000; Bielsky
et al., 2004). Oxytocin knockoutmice “recover” social habituation
after infusion of oxytocin agonists in central amygdala (Ferguson
et al., 2001). Similarly, local infusion of V1a-R antagonists in lat-
eral septum of rats inhibits habituation to conspecifics (Everts and
Koolhaas, 1999). Thus, both oxytocin and vasopressin regulate
social recognition.
The endogenous opioid system is another neuronal mecha-
nism that may play a role in pair-bond formation. Mu-opioid
receptor (MOR) activation modulates partner preference in
female prairie voles (Burkett et al., 2011). MOR density is striatal
region specific, thus this effect is probably mediated by specific
striatal regions (Resendez et al., 2013). MORs within the dorsal
striatummediate partner preference formation via impairment of
mating, whereas receptors in NAcc appear to mediate pair bond
formation through the positive hedonics associated with mating
(Resendez et al., 2013). Interestingly, monogamous voles show
higher MOR density in forebrain including the caudate-putamen
and NAcc than the closely-related polygamous voles (Inoue et al.,
2013), but see (Insel and Shapiro, 1992). Thus, interspecies dif-
ferences in opiate receptor density and pharmacological effects
suggest a role of opiates in social attachment.
A relevant question is how and where these neurotransmit-
ter systems interact. Rat NAcc core neurons expressing D1-like
receptors co-express prodynorphin, conversely D2-like express-
ing cells co-express proenkephalin (Curran and Watson, 1995).
An electron microscope investigation indicates that about half
of neurons in the rat dorsolateral striatum co-express D2 and
MORs (Ambrose et al., 2004). These anatomical studies support
the possibility that oxytocin, vasopressin and D2-like receptors
are present in single striatal cells, yet their interactions remain to
be further investigated.
Little is known about pair-bond formation in primates.
However, marmosets, a monogamous new-world monkey, show
oxytocin receptor labeling in NAcc among other subcorti-
cal structures (Schorscher-Petcu et al., 2009), whereas rhesus
macaques, a polygamous old-world monkey, only show label-
ing for this receptor in hypothalamus and the nucleus basalis of
Meynert (Freeman et al., 2012). Titi monkeys are a monogamous
species that exhibit small, but significant, changes in glucose
intake in the NAcc and ventral pallidum 48 hr. after mating (Bales
et al., 2007).
Whereas we have learned about pair-bond formation, the neu-
ronal mechanisms of pair-bond maintenance are just starting to
be investigated. For example, monogamous male voles show a
significant increase in D1-like receptors in NAcc after pair-bond
formation, and D1-like receptor antagonists diminish aggressive
behavior toward female strangers—a behavioral marker of pair
bond formation (Aragona et al., 2006). This is probably the most
exciting open question in pair-bond formation, what are the
neuronal mechanisms of pair-bond maintenance?
The striatum might also play a role in mother’s recognition
of offspring. The pregnancy hormones progesterone and oestro-
gen prime the brain for the synthesis of oxytocin and its receptor
(Keverne and Curley, 2004). Olfaction is the prime sense for
maternal offspring recognition in mammals. Oxytocin receptors
expression increases in central olfactory projections and NAcc
during pregnancy (Keverne and Curley, 2004).
Overall, these studies suggest a mechanism for pair-bonding
formation in voles. The hypothetical mechanism is centered in
the striatum’s capability to facilitate the association between olfac-
tory social cues and reward. A potential mate’s pheromones reach
the vomeronasal organ (VNO), which in turns transmits the indi-
vidual’s information to the extended amygdala and the central
amygdala further transmits this information to striatum. VNO
lesions in female voles disrupt pair formation (Curtis et al., 2001),
a finding that supports this hypothetical mechanism. However,
other brain areas may also play a role in pair-bond formation.
For example there are marked differences in the distribution of
dopamine, oxytocin and vasopressin receptors in the medial pre-
frontal cortex of monogamous and promiscuous voles (Smeltzer
et al., 2006). As noted by Wang and Young (Lim et al., 2004b;
Young and Wang, 2004), the cellular mechanism might be the
co-activation of D2-expressing accumbal neurons by vasopressin
and/or oxytocin. Oxytocin is released by the hypothalamus, odor
information transmitted from the central amygdala and DA is
released by dopaminergic neurons in VTA. Striatal neurons are
well-suited for detecting the conjunction of sensorimotor infor-
mation and reward. In pair-bond formation the role of the
striatum, particularly the NAcc is to facilitate the association of
social cues and reward to guarantee reproductive success.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the studies reviewed here, we conclude that the stria-
tum plays a role in computations that take place during social
behavior. These computations revolve around social actions and
social rewards. fMRI and neurophysiology studies show that
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neural activity in the striatum is modulated by social rewards
and by learning in a social context (Figure 3). By learning in
this context we refer to: learning about other’s preferences, a new
mate, about other’s actions that lead to own reward, or updat-
ing our predictions about other’s preferences. We have shown
that neuronal activity in the striatum is also modulated by social
actions and, critically, by the conjunction of social action and own
reward (Figure 4). The computations performed by the stria-
tum are critical for successful social interactions. A breakdown in
social interactions leads to compromised striatal function, which
highlights the interplay between this neuronal circuit and social
behavior.
Overall, these observations suggest that the striatum does not
appear to have a particular “social” specialization; rather its neu-
rons are capable of flexibly incorporating social information into
their computations. Therefore, it is justified to speak of the stria-
tum as containing a general purpose neuronal mechanism to
associate actions or events with reward. Importantly, it can also
associate—or reflect—other’s actions to the rewards they lead to.
Rewards are also coded in the activity of striatal neurons, and as
social rewards are a sub-class of rewards, they are processed in the
striatum. Importantly, a functional subdivision based on different
types of social behaviors need to await further experimentation.
In conclusion, the striatum plays a role in the computation of
social behavior.
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